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Introduction 
“That rational and most excellent work of nature, Man”  (Hobbes, 1997: 81). This 
is how Hobbes bases his introductory account on the creation of the 
Commonwealth. A politics founded upon rationality and thus an unnatural product 
of man. Years later this principle came to underpin the mainstream school of 
thought in International Relations (IR) i.e. the classical Realism. As a subfield of 
IR, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) reflected the assumptions of classical Realism 
into an analytical theory known as Rational Actor Model (RAM). While limitations 
to the human rationality in the process of decision-making contested its 
applicability to international politics, it still remains a fundamental analytical tool. 
In fact, it can be a powerful analytical model only if the scholarship correctly 
appreciates its theoretical ground. Knowing what the theories are for, and how they 
are supposed to be applied are necessary prerequisites to their proper efficacy as 
helpful analytical tools. That is to say, if RAM had not wrongly been applied to the 
problems, it would not have misguided the FPA theorists. 
This paper‟s purpose is to offer a conceptual breakthrough on RAM so as to 
enhance its ability in a way that will let analysts to accommodate some of the 
anomalies into the theoretical ground of RAM, without greatly undermining its 
validity. Such precaution is necessary to take because admittedly, RAM‟s continual 
prominence within the discipline owes much to its explanatory power as a valid 
analytical tool, without which the whole notion of rationality in politics would be 
called into question. To accomplish the task, first, I shall examine RAM as a 
predictive model of action.Later, by analysing the nature of explanans in IR, I shall 
discuss the mission of theories in perceiving of social science problems with a view 
to reinterpret RAM as an integrate-able model of analysis. 
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RAM as a model 
To make sense of foreign policy actions, FPA models attempt to explain how and 
why a key policy is adopted. As one such model, RAM seeks explanation for 
foreign policy outcomes or the „events‟; this must be contrasted to the study of 
foreign policy „processes‟ (Allison et al., 1999: 13). „Events‟, as Hudson remarked, 
consist of what actually happened, and how they did happen so (Hudson, 2005: 9). 
Accordingly, ‟events‟ are the subject of analysis of RAM. In this theory, it is 
assumed that choice is made by a recourse to a rational procedure. And that actions 
are the products of careful calculations in that procedure. 
The decision-making procedure, according to RAM, involves four main stages 
(Heywood, 2014: 134). The first step is to identify the problem. That is to make 
meaning out of a complex shapeless reality. For meanings do not exist per se, 
rather they are subjective interpretations of objective facts. To comprehend this 
better, for instance, consider Iran‟s possession of the nuclear technology as a fact. 
How her neighbours make meaning of this fact is up to their interpretations which 
will determine their positions towards this fact. One such a meaning could 
theoretically vary on a continuum from perception of an absolute insecurity to pure 
security. The answer to their positions lies not in the crude fact itself, but in the 
complex of circumstances involved. Secondly, the preferences of expected foreign 
policy outcomes have to be ranked orderly. That is the very simple logic which 
expects a rational actor to order his goals in a way that: 
if „A‟ is preferred over „B‟ 
and „B‟ over „C‟, 
then „A‟ is preferred over „C‟ (Stein, 2012: 131). 
Translating „A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ with foreign policy options, a decision making entity 
would not be rational if, to exemplify, it were to prefer diplomacy over economic 
sanctions and economic sanctions over military engagement while preferring 
military choice over diplomacy. Thirdly, a thorough assessment on the 
consequences of available options must be carried out. This can be an actual 
research or alternatively a thought experiment in which a logical „flow of events‟ 
are imagined. An example of the latter would be the Prisoner‟s Dilemma where the 
rational choice of either actors depends upon the expected rationale of the other. 
Finally, a rational choice must be that would “reflect mostly preferred consequence 
among ranked goals” (Allison et al., 1999: 18).  
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Built on a Hobbesian account of politics (ibid: 17), RAM does not take normative 
constraints to be a factor of the decision-making equation. Decisions are made only 
with regard to goals. Rationality entails that the decision makers make decisions in 
such a way to maximise their expected utility (Nau, 1998: 2). This means that both 
pros and cons are taken into consideration in the decision-making procedure. It is 
not difficult to see how different decision-makers can have different preferences in 
different orders. Accordingly, aggregating individual preferences (Stein, 2012: 
143) is devoid of rationality, because rationality is defined only with regard to an 
individula‟s specifically determined preference. As a result, RAM would 
essentially become a reductionist theory (Hees, 1997: 51), meaning that individuals 
are conceived as the primary agents. In this model, policies are adopted because of 
rational calculations of an individual human actor.  
 
Limitations of RAM 
With the above account one can easily pinpoint basic limitations to RAM. Most 
notably, many foreign policy events are the result of consensual decision-making. 
These are sometimes legally included in decision-making systems at both domestic 
and international level of decision-making. For instance, in Article 27 of United 
Nations Charter, the decisions of Security Council “shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members” 
(UN Charter). Likewise, decisions made in parliamentary systems fall under the 
category of consensual decision-making too. It follows that in all non-individual 
decision-making systems RAM is an inapplicable model of analysis. 
Furthermore, even if decisions are exclusively made by individuals, the model can 
still give false predictions. Advancements in psychology and neuroscience have 
revealed limitations to human rationality. In order to function properly, RAM 
requires rational human actors. In contrast, human decision-making is found prone 
to deviations from rational procedure. One such psychological source of deviation 
is the loss aversion (Stein, 2012: 139). This is a condition in which the decision 
maker accepts greater risks in bad situations than he normally does “when things 
are going well” (ibid). A good example would be Hitler's decision to invade the 
Soviet Union. He did only make this detrimental decision when he failed to 
convince the English into peace. Other psychological deviations include a tendency 
for simplification of complex reality, and the desire to keep beliefs consistent vis-a-
vis contradictory evidences (Stein: 139). In terms of neuroscience, emotions are the 
overriding obstacle to rationality. Neuroscience studies unveil how emotions 
precede reason. Indeed, it is found that every rational thought is first processed in 
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the emotional brain or the Limbic System to find its relation with the organism‟s 
survival (McDermott, 2004: 693). Those feelings like pride, dignity, fear, greed, 
jealousy and so forth are all paradigms of emotions that influence the cognitive 
brain. Returning to the same example, Hitler‟s greed for extraterritorial 
expansionism might, conceivably, have inhibited him from rational calculation of 
the consequences of his decision to attack the Soviets.  
 
The nature of theories 
Looking on the above examples, RAM would have predicted results contrary to the 
„events‟- i.e. what actually happened and how? And so far it has failed as a reliable 
predictive model of analysis. What has gone wrong? Below, it will be argued that 
because of the nature of explanans in social science, theories are more than 
predictive models. The expectation of giving law-governed relationships would bea 
wrong starting point to the understanding of IR. 
Law-governed systems give consistent results under homologous conditions. When 
we model predictive theories in scientific studies we look for generalisations that 
lead to consistent laws. In science the explanan is the structure that determines the 
consistent outcomes. Structural determinism refers to the idea that social science 
can be studied by finding law-governed relationships. In fact, such approaches 
were earlier made by making use of computerised decision aiders to generalise the 
„events‟ into grand foreign policy theories (Hudson, 2012: 29). Expectedly, the 
results turned incoherent (ibid). In contrast, the omnipresence of structure and 
agency constitute the explanans of social science (Carlsnaes, 1992). It is intuitively 
conceivable that structures determine actions and that those actions will form the 
future structures, and that this chain continues to infinity (Fig1) (ibid: 260). Social 
theories are developed to explain the links between the structures to agents and 
vice versa. Different theories reveal different aspects of the same reality. In this 
sense, antithetical political theories are not contradictory ones. For example, 
neorealism‟s structural explanation for the nuclear proliferation does not have to 
falsify RAM‟s agent-based explanation. Rather, they may both give true insights 
into the same reality. Therefore, best analyses are the ones that integrate insights 
from different theories that explain the role of both structures and agents. Even 
though an expectation for the possibility of law-like predictive theories in politics 
is to confuse the nature of explanans in social theories with that of the scientific 
laws.  
If theories are expected to explain different aspects of complex reality, a powerful 
model is the one that can be integrated with others. To make meaning of foreign 
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policy, FPA theories offer actor-specific solutions where individuals are the 
primary agents. In contrast, IR offers actor-general theories (Hudson, 2005: 1) that 
generally favour the structural side of foreign policy. Therefore, IR and FPA 
effectively share their explanandum. A comprehensive analysis must take as much 
of the Structure-Agency spectrum as possible into consideration. In such a way, 
integration of IR with FPA gives rise to the critical Foreign Policy (FP) that takes 
account of both the structure and the agency (Smith et al., 2012: 6). RAM is a 
powerful explanatory model because its theoretical ground allows its incorporation 
into structural theories of IR. Bridging the IR-FPA gap, RAM allows the decision-
makers to develop strategic plans of action. In Down‟s wording we may ask “What 
would actually happen if men…behave rationally?”(Down, 1957: 19). Thereafter, 
hypothetical thought experiments can be designed to reciprocate the other player‟s 
best choice appropriately. In this way, RAM yields IR with creativity for human 
action (Hudson, 2005: 4). But why and how RAM can be integrated with IR? 
Before going to answer this question first we explain why sometimes RAM had 
given false analytical predictions. 
False predictions arise from incorrect application of theoretical models into real-
world problems. Misleadingly, this will cause the theory to look like an invalid 
model of analysis. As Wohforth argued, however, in essence each theory is 
composed of three constituent components.These components include assumptions, 
scope conditions and predictions (Wohlforth, 2012: 41). If the assumptions are 
proven wrong then the theory is falsified. For it would suggest that the theory was 
incompatible with reality. However, correct assumptions are not solely enough to 
yield realistic predictions. Rather, a theory is only capable to predict in specified 
circumstances. We call these circumstances the scope conditions of the theory. 
False predictions occur when analysts confuse assumptions with scope conditions 
of a theory. In the case of RAM, it is assumed that the actor is a self-interested 
individual agent. Its predictions in a hypothetical scenario would be a particular 
decision or foreign policy outcome. However, it is important to notice that it is not 
assumed the actor is rational. Rather, rationality is the scope condition of the RAM 
theory. It follows that RAM is only applicable to problems wherein the actor is 
rational and has received full information for processing. Applying RAM otherwise 
would be the main pitfall that would cause RAM to look like an invalid analytical 
tool. 
 
The conceptual breakthrough 
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In RAM, rationality is the means to aspire to the goals. However, since rationality 
does not define the goals in the first place the goals are left unexplained (Carlsnaes, 
1992: 251). This characteristic is the conceptual breakthrough that allows 
integration of RAM with structural IR. Indeed, the goals in RAM can be the 
product of structures. This model is diagrammatically represented to show how the 
structure and agency can be linked in RAM (Fig 2). That the analysis of a foreign 
policy „event‟ starts off by exploring the rationale behind. Then, in order to make 
sense of the „events‟, structural factors are used to understand the goals of the 
actor. Accordingly, the goals, themselves, no matter how non-utilitarian can never 
be irrational. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the Structure-Agency dichotomy is 
not resolved since the proposed model is still a bottom-up relationship in which the 
structure is privileged to be the ultimate determinant of choice (Carlsnaes, 2012: 
126). In this way, neuroscientific and psychological deviations do not undermine 
RAM‟s credibility insofar as they influence the goals of the decision-makers. 
To show how, let us consider the Anticipated Emotion as one such psychological 
deviations. It suggests that emotions make us to decide on choices that maximise 
our happiness (McDermott, 2004: 698) while rationality entails the adoption of 
choices that maximise utility. For a human actor a smaller loss when a greater one 
was anticipated is more rejoicing than a smaller gain when a larger one was 
expected. If the actors in the RAM theory were assumed utility maximisers this 
deviation would falsify the theory. The trick is to replace the economic theory of 
utility for the psychological theory of Anticipated Emotion so that the emotions 
determine the unexplained goals of the actor. If, as we suggested above, the 
impossibility of having irrational goals holds true, non-utilitarian decisions would 
not be necessarily irrational ones. It must be clear that RAM is flexible to 
accommodate similar anomalies into its theoretical ground.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, RAM continues to remain a prominent mainstream theory of FP 
because, as a theory, it has powerful explanatory potential. It is important to recall 
that social theories must not be applied to cases as though they are predictive laws. 
Rather, they are supposed to be understood as useful analytical tools that help 
analysts to gain better insights. Thereby, RAM is a very powerful analytical theory 
despite having serious limitations as a predictive model of action. Incorporating 
insights from different theories reveals a clearer vision of the complex reality. 
RAM is a powerful explanatory tool because, if correctly understood and 
appropriately applied, it can be integrated with structural theories of IR. We have 
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Agent Level: 
Determining 
Rational Action 
shown that a modified account on assumptions, scope conditions and predictions of 
RAM is capable of encompassing, in part the Agency-Structure, psychological and 
neuroscientific dimensions of the complex reality. 
Figure 1:  
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Rational Actor Model (RAM) has continued to be a powerful explanatory theory of foreign 
policy analysis. Even though, limitations on the human rationality in decision-making place 
restrictions on its validity as a predictive model of analysis. These limitations mainly arise 
from false expectations from RAM as an analytical tool. Reinterpreting the mission of 
theories in social science would address the drawbacks associated with such false 
expectations from theories. A conceptual breakthrough is discussed that allows RAM to 
overcome the limitations upon its validity. This discussion argues on the appropriate 
application of RAM onto real world problems which would open space for the integration 
of RAM into other IR-FPA theories.  
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